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Article definition: 
Adaptive resonance theory, or ART, is a cognitive and neural theory about how the brain 
develops and learns to recognize and recall objects and events throughout life. ART 
shows how processes of learning, categorization, expectation, attention, resonance, 
synchronization, and memory search interact to enable the brain to learn quickly and to 
retain its memories stably, while explaining many data about perception, cognition, 
learning memory, and consciousness along the way. 
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Introduction 
The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about, recognize, and recall a changing 
world in a stable fashion throughout life are among the most important for understanding 
cognition. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these 
expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of 
information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes 
as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside 
world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states, and that these 
resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which 
summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. 
ART was introduced in Grossberg (1976a, 1976b), along with rules for competitive learning and 
self-organizing maps. Since then, psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART 
have been reported in experiments on vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, 
variable-rate speech perception, somatosensmy perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, 
among others; e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg (1991, 1993), Grossberg (1999a, 1999b) and 
Grossberg and Merrill (1996). In particular, ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels 
of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar 
circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will 
be found, suitably specialized, in the laminar circuits of all sensmy and cognitive neocortex. 
Although ART-style learning and matching processes seem to be found in many sensory and 
cognitive processes, another type of learning and matching are often found in spatial and motor 
processes. In particular, it is suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What 
processing stream of the brain obey learning and matching laws that are often complementary to 
those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables 
our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the 
world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are 
no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural 
memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports 
these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance. 
The stability-plasticity dilemma: Rapid learning throughout life 
We experience the world as a whole. Although myriad signals relentlessly bombard our senses, 
we somehow integrate them into unified moments of conscious experience that cohere together 
despite their diversity. Because of the apparent unity and coherence of our awareness, we can 
develop a sense of self that can gradually mature with our experiences of the world. This 
capacity lies at the heart of our ability to function as intelligent beings. 
The apparent unity and coherence of our experiences is all the more remarkable when we 
consider several properties of how the brain copes with the environmental events that it 
processes. First and foremost, these events are highly context-sensitive. When we look at a 
complex picture or scene as a whole, we can often recognize its objects and its meaning at a 
glance, as in the picture of a familiar face. However, if we process the face piece-by-piece, as 
through a small aperture, then its significance may be greatly degraded. To cope with this 
context-sensitivity, the brain typically processes pictures and other sense data in parallel, as 
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patterns of activation across a large number of feature-sensitive nerve cells, or neurons. The 
same is true for senses other than vision, such as audition. If the sound of the word GO is altered 
by clipping off the vowel 0, then the consonant G may sound like a chirp, quite unlike its sound 
as part of GO. 
During vision, all the signals from a scene typically reach the photosensitive retinas of the eyes 
at essentially the same time, so parallel processing of all the scene's parts begins at the retina 
itself. During audition, each successive sound reaches the ear at a later time. Before an entire 
pattern of sounds, such as the word GO, can be processed as a whole, it needs to be recoded, at a 
later processing stage, into a simultaneously available spatial pattern of activation. Such a 
processing stage is often called a working memory, and the activations that it stores are often 
called short term memory (STM) traces. For example, when you hear an unfamiliar telephone 
number, you can temporarily store it in working memory while you walk over to the telephone 
and dial the number. 
In order to determine which of these patterns represents familiar events and which do not, the 
brain matches these patterns against stored representations of previous experiences that have 
been acquired through learning. Unlike the STM traces that are stored in a working memory, the 
learned experiences are stored in long term memory (L TM) traces. One difference between 
STM and LTM traces concerns how they react to distractions. For example, if you are distracted 
by a loud noise before you dial a new telephone number, its STM representation can be rapidly 
reset so that you forget it. On the other hand, if you are distracted by a loud noise, you 
(hopefully) will not forget the LTM representation of your own name. 
How does learning of new information get stably stored in LTM? For example, after seeing an 
exciting movie just once, we can tell our friends many details about it later on, even though the 
individual scenes flashed by very quickly. More generally, we can quickly learn about new 
environments, even if no one tells us how the rules of each environment differ. To a surprising 
degree, we can rapidly learn new facts without being forced to just as rapidly forget what we 
already know. As a result, we do not need to avoid going out into the world for fear that, in 
learning to recognize a new friend's face, we will suddenly forget our parents' faces. This is 
sometimes called the problem of catastrophic forgetting. 
Many contemporary learning algorithms can forget catastrophically. In contrast, the brain is 
capable of rapid yet stable autonomous learning of huge amounts of data in an ever-changing 
world. Discovering the brain's solution to this key problem is as important for understanding 
ourselves as it is for developing new pattern recognition and prediction applications in 
technology. 
I have called the problem whereby the brain learns quickly and stably without catastrophically 
forgetting its past knowledge the stability-plasticity dilemma. The stability-plasticity dilemma 
must be solved by every brain system that needs to rapidly and adaptively respond to the flood of 
signals that subserves even the most ordinary experiences. If the brain's design is parsimonious, 
then we should expect to find similar design principles operating in all the brain systems that can 
stably learn an accumulating knowledge base in response to changing conditions throughout life. 
The discovery of such principles should also clarify how the brain unifies diverse sources of 
information into coherent moments of conscious experience. 
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The link between learning, expectation, attention, and resonance 
Humans are intentional beings who learn expectation about the world and make predictions 
about what is about to happen. Humans are also attentional beings who focus processing 
resources upon a restricted amount of incoming information at any time. Why are we both 
intentional and attentional beings, and are these two types of processes related? The stability-
plasticity dilemma and its solution using resonant states provides a unifying framework for 
understanding these issues. 
To fix ideas about how we use a sensory or cognitive expectation, and how a resonant state is 
activated, suppose you were asked to "find the yellow ball within one-half second, and you will 
win a $10,000 prize". Activating an expectation of "yellow balls" enables more rapid detection 
of a yellow ball, and with a more energetic neural response, than if you were not looking for it. 
Sensory and cognitive top-down expectations hereby lead to excitatory matching with 
confirmatory bottom-up data. On the other hand, mismatch between top-down expectations and 
bottom-up data can suppress the mismatched part of the bottom-up data, and thereby start to 
focus attention upon the matched, or expected, part of the bottom-up data. 
This sort of excitat01y matching and attentional focusing on bottom-up data using top-down 
expectations is proposed to generate resonant brain states: When there is a good enough match 
between bottom-up and top-down signal patterns between two or more levels of processing, their 
positive feedback signals amplify and prolong their mutual activation, leading to a resonant state. 
The amplification and prolongation of the system's fast activations is sufficient to trigger 
learning in the more slowly varying adaptive weights that control the signal flow along pathways 
from cell to cell. Resonance hereby provides a global context-sensitive indicator that the system 
is processing data worthy of learning. That is why the theory which describes these processes is 
called Adaptive Resonance The01y, or ART. 
ART thus predicts that there is an intimate connection between the mechanisms which enable us 
to learn quickly and stably about a changing world, and the mechanisms that enable us to learn 
expectations about such a world, test hypotheses about it, and focus attention upon information 
that we find interesting. ART also proposes that, in order to solve the stability-plasticity 
dilemma, only resonant states can drive rapid new learning, which gives the theory its name. 
Learning within the sensory and cognitive domain is often match learning. Match learning 
occurs only if a good enough match occurs between bottom-up information and a learned top-
down expectation that is read out by an active recognition category, or code. When such an 
approximate match occurs, previously learned knowledge can be refined. If novel information 
cannot form a good enough match with the expectations that are read-out by previously learned 
recognition categories, then a memory search, or hypothesis testing, is triggered that leads to 
selection and learning of a new recognition categ01y, rather than catastrophic forgetting of an old 
one. Figure 1 illustrates how this happens in an ART model; it will be discussed in greater detail 
below. In contrast, learning within spatial and motor processes is proposed to be mismatch 
learning that continuously updates sensory-motor maps or the gains of sensory-motor 
commands. As a result, we can stably learn what is happening in a changing world, thereby 
solving the stability-plasticity dilemma, while adaptively updating our representations of where 
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objects are and how to act upon them using bodies whose parameters change continuously 
through time. 
It has been mathematically proved that match learning within an ART model leads to stable 
memories in response to arbitrary list of events to be learned (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991). 
Match learning also has a serious potential weakness, however: If you can only learn when there 
is a good enough match between bottom-up data and learned top-down expectations, then how 
do you ever learn anything that you do not already know? ART proposes that this problem is 
solved by the brain by using another complementary interaction, this one between processes of 
resonance and reset, that are predicted to control properties of attention and memory search, 
respectively. These complementary processes help our brains to balance between the 
complementary demands of processing the familiar and the unfamiliar, the expected and the 
unexpected. One of these complementary processes is predicted to take place in the What 
cortical stream, notably in the visual, inferotemporal, and prefrontal cortex. It is here that top-
down expectations are matched against bottom-up inputs (Chelazzi, et a!., 1998; Miller et a!, 
1996). When a top-down expectation achieves a good enough match with bottom-up data, this 
match process focuses attention upon those feature clusters in the bottom-up input that are 
expected. If the expectation is close enough to the input pattern, then a state of resonance 
develops as the attentional focus takes hold. 
Figure l illustrates these ART ideas in a simple two-level example. Here, a bottom-up input 
pattern, or vector, I activates a pattern X of activity across the feature detectors of the first level 
F 1. For example, a visual scene may be represented by the features comprising its boundary and 
surface representations. This feature pattern represents the relative importance of different 
features in the inputs pattern I. In Figure lA, the pattern peaks represent more activated feature 
detector cells, the troughs less activated feature detectors. This feature pattern sends signals S 
through an adaptive filter to the second level F2 at which a compressed representation Y (also 
called a recognition category, or a symbol) is activated in response to the distributed input T. 
Input Tis computed by multiplying the signal vectorS by a matrix of adaptive weights that can 
be altered through learning. The representation Y is compressed by competitive interactions 
across F2 that allow only a small subset of its most strongly activated cells to remain active in 
response to T. The pattern Yin the figure indicates that a small number of categ01y cells may be 
activated to different degrees. These category cells, in turn, send top-down signals U to F 1• The 
vector U is converted into the top-down expectation V by being multiplied by another matrix of 
adaptive weights. When Vis received by F1, a matching process takes place between the input 
vector I and V which selects that subset X* of F1 features that were "expected" by the active F2 
category Y. The set of these selected features is the emerging "attentional focus". 
Reconciling distributed and symbolic representations using resonance 
If the top-down expectation is close enough to the bottom-up input pattern, then the pattern X* of 
attended features reactivates the categ01y Y which, in turn, reactivates X*. The network hereby 
locks into a resonant state through a positive feedback loop that dynamically links, or binds, the 
attended features across X* with their category, or symbol, Y. 
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Figure 1. Search for a recognition code 
within an ART learning circuit: (A) The 
input pattern I is instated across the 
feature detectors at level F1 as a short 
term memory (STM) activity pattern X. 
Input I also nonspecifically activates the 
orienting system p; that is, all the input 
pathways converge on p and can 
activate it. STM pattern X is represented 
by the hatched pattern across F1. Pattern 
X both inhibits p and generates the 
output pattern S. Pattern S is multiplied 
by learned adaptive weights, also called 
long term memory (L TM) traces. These 
L TM -gated signals are added at F2 cells, 
or nodes, to form the input pattern T, 
which activates the STM pattern Y 
across the recognition categories coded 
at level F2. (B) Pattern Y generates the 
top-down output pattern U which is 
+ multiplied by top-down LTM traces and 
1----.....1 added at F 1 nodes to form a prototype 
pattern V that encodes the learned 
expectation of the active F2 nodes. Such a prototype represents the set of commonly shared 
features in all the input patterns capable of activating Y. IfV mismatches 1 at F1, then a new STM 
activity pattern X* is selected at F1. X* is represented by the hatched pattern. It consists of the 
features of I that are confirmed by V. Mismatched features are inhibited. The inactivated nodes 
corresponding to unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The reduction in total STM activity 
which occurs when X is transformed into X* causes a decrease in the total inhibition fl·om F1 to 
p. (C) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, p releases a nonspecific arousal wave to F2; that is, a 
wave of activation that equally activates all F2 nodes. This wave instantiates the intuition that 
"novel events are arousing". This arousal wave resets the STM pattern Y at F2 by inhibiting Y. 
(D) After Y is inhibited, its top-down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at 
F1. The prior reset event maintains inhibition of Y during the search cycle. As a result, X can 
activate a different STM pattern Y at F2. If the top-down prototype due to this new Y pattern also 
mismatches I at F1, then the search for an appropriate F2 code continues until a more appropriate 
F 2 representation is selected. Such a search cycle represents a type of nonstationary hypothesis 
testing. When search ends, an attentive resonance develops and learning of the attended data is 
initiated. [Adapted with permission from Carpenter and Grossberg (1993).] 
The individual features at F1 have no meaning on their own, just like the pixels in a picture are 
meaningless one-by-one. The category, or symbol, in F 2 is sensitive to the global patterning of 
these features, but it cannot represent the "contents" of the experience, including their conscious 
qualia, due to the very fact that a category is a compressed, or "symbolic" representation. It has 
often been erroneously claimed that a single system is doomed to either process distributed 
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features or symbolic representations, but not both. This is not true in ART. The resonance 
between these two types of information converts the pattern of attended features into a coherent 
context-sensitive state that is linked to its category through feedback. It is this coherent state, that 
joins together distributed features and symbolic categories, that can enter consciousness. ART 
predicts that all conscious states are resonant states. In particular, such a resonance binds 
spatially distributed features into either a stable equilibrium or a synchronous oscillation. Such 
synchronous oscillations have recently attracted much interest after being reported in 
neurophysiological experiments. This type of oscillation was predicted in the 1976 articles which 
introduced ART (see Grossberg, 1999b). 
Resonance mediates between information processing and learning 
In ART, the resonant state, rather than bottom-up activation, is predicted to drive the learning 
process. The resonant state persists long enough, and at a high enough activity level, to activate 
the slower learning processes in the adaptive weights that guide the flow of signals between 
bottom-up and top-down pathways between levels F1 and F2. This viewpoint helps to explain 
how adaptive weights that were changed through previous learning can regulate the brain's 
present information processing, without learning about the signals that they are currently 
processing unless they can initiate a resonant state. Through resonance as a mediating event, one 
can see from a deeper viewpoint why humans are intentional beings who are continually 
predicting what may next occur, and why we tend to learn about the events to which we pay 
attention. 
How are learning and hypothesis testing related? 
A sufficiently bad mismatch between an active top-down expectation and a bottom-up input, say 
because the input represents an unfamiliar type of experience, can drive a memory search. Such a 
mismatch within the attentional system is proposed to activate a complementary orienting 
system, which is sensitive to unexpected and unfamiliar events. ART suggests that this orienting 
system includes the hippocampal system, which has long been known to be involved in 
mismatch processing, including the processing of novel events (e.g., Otto and Eichenbaum, 
1992). Output signals from the orienting system rapidly reset the recognition category that has 
been reading out the poorly matching top-down expectation (Figure lB and !C). The cause of 
the mismatch is hereby removed, thereby freeing the system to activate a different recognition 
category (Figure ld). The reset event hereby triggers memory search, or hypothesis testing, 
which automatically leads to the selection of a recognition categmy that can better match the 
input. 
If no such recognition category exists, say because the bottom-up input represents a truly novel 
experience, then the search process automatically activates an as yet uncommitted population of 
cells, with which to learn about the novel information. This learning process works well under 
both unsupervised and supervised conditions (e.g., Carpenter et a/., 1994 ). Unsupervised 
learning means that the system can learn how to categorize novel input patterns without any 
external feedback. Supervised learning uses predictive errors to let the system know whether it 
has categorized the information correctly. Supervision can force a search for new categories that 
may be culturally determined, and are not based on feature similarity alone. For example, 
separating the letters E and F into separate recognition categories is culturally determined; they 
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are quite similar based on visual similarity alone. If the input pattern directly represented the 
pixels of E and F (which it, in general, would not), then both E and F might be classified in the 
same categmy with the categ01y prototype ofE, unless supervised feedback indicated that E is an 
incorrect response when F is the correct answer. Such error-based feedback enables variants of E 
and F to learn their own category and category prototype. Taken together, the interacting 
processes of attentive-learning and orienting-search hereby realize a type of error correction 
through hypothesis testing that can build an ever-growing, self-refining internal model of a 
changing world. 
How is the generality of knowledge controlled? Exemplars and prototypes 
A key problem about cognition concerns what combinations of features or other information are 
bound together into object or event representations. In particular, it is tempting to believe that 
exemplars, or individual experiences, are learned because humans can have very specific 
memories. For example, we can easily recognize the faces of each of our friends. On the other 
hand, storing every remembered experiences as exemplars can easily lead to a formidable 
combinatorial explosion of memory, as well as to difficult problems of memory retrieval. In 
addition, it is clear that we are also able to learn prototypes that can represent quite general 
properties of the environment (Posner and Keele, 1970). For example, we can recognize that 
eve1yone has a face. But then how do we learn specific episodic memories? ART provides a new 
answer to this question that overcomes problems faced by earlier models. 
ART systems learn prototypes, but the generality of these prototypes can be controlled by a 
process of vigilance which can be influenced by environmental feedback or internal volition 
(Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 1999b ). Low vigilance permits the learning of 
general categories with abstract prototypes. High vigilance forces a memory search to occur for a 
new categ01y when even small mismatches exist between an exemplar and the category that it 
activates. As a result, in the limit of high vigilance, the category prototype may encode an 
individual exemplar. Vigilance is computed within the orienting system of an ART model 
(Figures IB-D). It is here that bottom-up excitation from all the active features in an input 
pattern I are compared with inhibition from all the active features in a distributed feature 
representation across FJ. If the ratio of the total activity across the active features in F 1 (that is, 
the "matched" features) to the total activity due to all the features in I is less than a vigilance 
parameter p (Figure !B), then a reset wave is activated (Figure !C), which can drive the search 
for another category with which to classify the exemplar. In other words, the vigilance parameter 
controls how bad a match can be before search for a new category is initiated. If the vigilance 
parameter is low, then many exemplars can all influence the learning of a shared prototype, by 
chipping away at the features which are not in common to all the exemplars. If the vigilance 
parameter is high, then even a small difference between a new exemplar and a known prototype 
(e.g., F vs. E) can drive the search for a new category with which to represent F. 
The simplest rule for controlling vigilance is called match tracking. Here a predictive error (e.g., 
E is predicted in response to F), the vigilance parameter increases until it is just higher than the 
ratio of active features in F1 to total features in I. In other words, vigilance "tracks" the degree of 
match between input exemplar and matched prototype. This is the minimal level of vigilance that 
can trigger a reset wave and thus a memory search for a new category. It has been shown that 
match tracking realizes a Minimax Learning Rule that conjointly maximizes category generality 
9 
while it minimizes predictive error. In other words, match tracking uses the least memory 
resources that can prevent errors from being made. 
Because vigilance can vary across learning trials, recognition categories capable of encoding 
widely differing degrees of generalization or abstraction can be learned by a single ART system. 
Low vigilance leads to broad generalization and abstract prototypes. High vigilance leads to 
narrow generalization and to prototypes that represent fewer input exemplars, even a single 
exemplar. Thus a single ART system may be used, say, to learn abstract prototypes with which 
to recognize abstract categories of faces and dogs, as well as "exemplar prototypes" with which 
to recognize individual faces and dogs. ART models hereby try to learn the most general 
category that is consistent with the data. This tendency can, for example, lead to the type of 
overgeneralization that is seen in young children until further learning leads to category 
refinement. Many benchmark studies of how ART uses vigilance control to classify complex 
data bases have shown that the number of ART categories that is learned scales well with the 
complexity of the input data; see Carpenter and Grossberg (1994) for illustrative benchmark 
studies. 
Memory consolidation and the emergence of rules 
As sequences of inputs are practiced over learning trials, the search process eventually converges 
upon stable categories. It has been mathematically proved (Carpenter and Grossberg, l987a) that 
familiar inputs directly access the category whose prototype provides the globally best match, 
while unfamiliar inputs engage the orienting subsystem to trigger memory searches for better 
categories until they become familiar. This process continues until the memory capacity, which 
can be chosen arbitrarily large, is fully utilized. The process whereby search is automatically 
disengaged is a form of memory consolidation that emerges from network interactions. 
Emergent consolidation does not preclude structural consolidation at individual cells, since the 
amplified and prolonged activities that subserve a resonance may be a trigger for learning-
dependent cellular processes, such as protein synthesis and transmitter production. It has also 
been shown that the adaptive weights which are learned by some ART models can, at any stage 
of learning, be translated into IF-THEN rules (e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg, 1994). Thus the 
ART model is a self-organizing rule-discovering production system as well as a neural network. 
These examples show that the claims of some cognitive scientists and AI practioners that neural 
network models cannot learn rule-based behaviors are incorrect. 
Corticohippocampal interactions and medial temporal amnesia 
As noted above, the attentional subsystem of ART has been used to model aspects of 
inferotemporal (IT) cortex, and the orienting subsystem models part of the hippocampal system. 
The interpretation of ART dynamics in terms ofiT cortex led Miller, Li, and Desimone (1991) to 
successfully test the prediction that cells in monkey IT cortex are reset after each trial in a 
working memory task. To illustrate the implications of an ART interpretation of IT-hippocampal 
interactions, I will review how a lesion of the ART model's orienting subsystem creates a formal 
memory disorder with symptoms much like the medial temporal amnesia that is caused in 
animals and human patients after hippocampal system lesions. In particular, such a lesion in vivo 
causes unlimited anterograde amnesia; limited retrograde amnesia; failure of consolidation; 
tendency to learn the first event in a series; abnormal reactions to novelty, including 
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perseverative reactions; normal priming; and normal information processing of familiar events. 
Unlimited anterograde amnesia occurs because the network cannot carry out the memmy search 
to learn a new recognition code. Limited retrograde amnesia occurs because familiar events can 
directly access correct recognition codes. Before events become familiar, memory consolidation 
occurs which utilizes the orienting subsystem (Figure I C). This failure of consolidation does 
not necessarily prevent learning per se. Instead, it is predicted to learn coarser categories due to 
the failure of vigilance control and memory search. For the same reason, learning may 
differentially influence the first recognition category activated by bottom-up processing, much as 
amnesics are particularly strongly wedded to the first response they learn. Perseverative 
reactions can occur because the orienting subsystem cannot reset sensmy representations or top-
down expectations that may be persistently mismatched by bottom-up cues. The inability to 
search memory prevents ART from discovering more appropriate stimulus combinations to 
attend. Normal priming occurs because it is mediated by the attentional subsystem. Data which 
support these predictions are summarized in Grossberg and Merrill (1996), who also note that 
these are not the only problems that can be caused by such a lesion due to the predicted role of 
hippocampal structures in learned spatial navigation and adaptive timing functions. 
Knowlton and Squire (1993) have reported that amnesics can classify items as members of a 
large category even if they are impaired on remembering the individual items themselves. To 
account for these results, the authors proposed that item and category memories are formed by 
distinct brain systems. Grossberg and Merrill (1996) suggested that their data could be explained 
by a single ART system in which the absence of vigilance control caused only coarse categories 
to form. Recently, Nosofsky and Zaki have quantitatively simulated the Knowlton and Squire 
data using a single-system model in which category sensitivity is low. 
Cortical substrates of ART matching 
How are ART top-down matching rules implemented in the cerebral cortex of the brain? An 
answer to this question has been recently proposed as part of a rapidly developing theory of why 
the cerebral cortex is typically organized into six distinct layers of cells (Grossberg, l999a). 
Earlier mathematical work had predicted that such a matching rule would be realized by a 
modulatory top-down on-center off~surround network (e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg, 1991; 
Grossberg, l999b ). Figure 2 shows how such a matching circuit may be realized in the cortex. In 
Figure 2, the top-down circuit generates outputs from cortical layer 6 of V2 that activate layer 6 
of VI via the vertical pathway between these layers that ends in an open triangle (which 
designates an excitatory connection). Cells in layer 6 of V l, in turn, activate an "on-center off-
surround" circuit to layer 4 of VI. In this circuit, an excitatmy cell (open circle) in layer 6 excites 
the excitatory cell (open circle) immediately above it in layer 4 via the vertical pathway from 
layer 6 to 4 that ends in an open triangle. This excitatory interaction constitutes the "on-center". 
The same excitatory cell in layer 6 also excites nearby inhibitmy cells (closed black circles) 
which, in turn, inhibit cells in layer 4. This spatially distributed inhibition constitutes the "off-
surround" of the layer 6 cell. The on-center is predicted to have a modulatory, or sensitizing, 
effect on layer 4, due to the balancing of excitatmy and inhibitory inputs to layer 4 within the on-
center. The inhibitory signals in the off-surround can strongly suppress unattended visual 
features. This arrangement clarifies how top-down attention can sensitize the brain to get ready 
for expected information that may or may not actually occur, without actively firing the 
sensitized target cells and thereby inadvertently creating hallucinations that the information is 
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already there. When this balance breaks down, hallucinations may, indeed, occur that have many 
of the properties reported by schizophrenic patients. 
V2 4 
6 
2/3 
V1 4 
6 
LGN T 0 T 0 
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Figure 2. The LAMINART model: 
The model is a synthesis of 
feedfo1ward (or bottom-up), feedback 
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interactions within and between the 
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visual cortical areas VI and V2. Cells 
and connections with open symbols 
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interactions. The stippled top-down 
connections indicate attentional 
feedback. See Grossberg (1999a) and 
Grossberg and Raizada (2000) for 
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work. [Adapted with permission from 
Grossberg and Raizada (2000).] 
Carpenter, G.A. and Grossberg, S. (1991). Pattern Recognition by Self-organizing Neural 
Networks. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Carpenter, G.A. and Grossberg, S. (1994). Integrating symbolic and neural processing in a self-
organizing architecture for pattern recognition and prediction. In V. Honavar and L. Uhr 
(Eds.), Artificial intelligence and neural networks: Steps towards principled 
prediction. San Diego: Academic Press, 387-421. 
Chelazzi, L., Duncan, J., Miller, E.K., and Desimone, R. (1998). Responses of neurons in 
inferior temporal cortex during memory-guided visual search. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 80, 2918-2940. 
Grossberg, S. (1999a). How does the cerebral cortex work? Learning, attention, and grouping by 
the laminar circuits of visual cortex. Spatial Vision, 12 163-186. 
12 
Grossberg, S. (1999b). The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 1-44. 
Grossberg, S. and Merrill, J.W.L. (1996). The hippocampus and cerebellum in adaptively timed 
learning, recognition, and movement. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 8, 257-277. 
Knowlton, B.J. and Squire, L.R. (1993). The learning of categories: Parallel brain systems for 
item mem01y and category knowledge. Science, 262, 1747-1749 
Miller, E.K., Erickson, C. A., and Desimone, R. (1996). Neural mechanisms of visual working 
mem01y in prefrontal cortex of the macaque. Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 5154-5167. 
Posner, M.I. and Keele, S.W. (1970). Retention of abstract ideas. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 83, 304-308. 
Otto, T. and Eichenbaum, H. (1992). Neuronal activity in the hippocampus during delayed non-
match to sample performance in rats: Evidence for hippocampal processing in 
recognition memory. Hippocampus, 2, 323-334. 
Bibliography 
Clark, E.V. (1973). What's in a word? On the child's acquisition of semantics in his first 
language. In T.E. M01Te (Ed.), Cognitive development and the acquisition of 
language. New York: Academic Press, 65-110. 
Goodale, M.A. and Milner, D. (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action. 
Trends in Neurosciences, 15, 20-25. 
Grossberg, S. (2000). How hallucinations may arise from brain mechanisms of learning, 
attention, and volition. Journal of the International Neuropc,ychological Society, 6, 583-
592. 
Lynch, G., McGaugh, J.L., and Weinberger, N.M. (Eds.) (1984). Neurobiology of learning and 
memory. New York: Guilford Press. 
Miller, E.K., Li, L., and Desimone, R. (1991 ). A neural mechanism for working and recognition 
mem01y in inferior temporal cortex. Science, 254, 1377-1379. 
Mishkin, M., Ungerleider, L.G., and Macko, K.A. (1983). Object vision and spatial vision: Two 
cortical pathways. Trends in Neurosciences, 6, 414-417. 
Nosofsky, R.M. and Zaki, S.R. (2000). Category learning and amnesia: An exemplar model 
perspective. Proceedings of the 2000 Memory Disorders Research Society Annual 
Meeting, Toronto, Canada. 
Sokolov, E.N. (1968). Mechanisms of memory. Moscow University Press. 
Squire, L.R. and Butters, N. (Eds.) (1984). Neuropsychology of memory. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Vinogradova, O.S. (1975). Functional organization of the limbic system in the process of 
registration of information: Facts and hypotheses. In R.L. Isaacson and K.H. Pribram 
(Eds.), The hippocampus, Vol. 2. Plenum Press, 3-69. 
